This paper examines the 225 banks that failed between February 2, 2007, and April 23, 2010, comparing them to a random sample of banks that had not failed as of April 23, 2010. We performed regression and discriminant analysis on quarterly call report data for one year, two years, three years, and four years prior to bank failure to determine whether the failure could have been predicted. Our model is statistically significant at the 1% level and predicts bank failures with 88.2% accuracy one year prior to failure, 78.6% two years prior to failure, 71.4% three years prior to failure, and 66.0% four years prior to failure.
I. INTRODUCTION
The economic crisis that began in 2007 put great pressure on the US banking system. By the time a bank's tangible capital ratio falls to the two percent threshold, it is often too late to save the bank; particularly as asset quality deteriorates -forcing banks to write down asset values, severely weakening the bank's capital position and leaving the FDIC to pick up the pieces. This is a major reason why the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve devised the "CAMELS" rating system which evaluates bank Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk to create a watch list of troubled or risky banks to be monitored between on-site examinations.
CAMELS ratings are kept strictly confidential by the Federal Reserve and are not available to the public. So, how can an investor or a lender identify and avoid weak banks early enough to prevent loss of value or liquidity associated with potential bank failure?
Because depositors are covered by FDIC insurance and do not concern themselves with bank failure, the moral hazard associated with failing banks offering high interest rates to depositors makes it imperative that such banks be identified early by regulators to safeguard taxpayer funds.
Altman's Z and Zeta® score models are oriented toward industrial companies, as are most of the eighty-nine other models described in Aziz and Dar's (2006) literature review.
Several recent articles use neural network methodologies to predict bank failures. These neural network methodologies are quite complicated and require a mapping of inputs to outputs using layers and neurons to create a "complex learned algorithm" (Muller, SteynBruwer and Hamman, 2009 ). This paper employs a multiple discriminant analysis methodology similar to Altman's to devise a bank failure prediction formula and uses variables available or calculable from quarterly bank call reports. We feel that developing a model with publicly available data will provide significant value to not only the FDIC, but also investment firms, financial analysts, and the banks themselves. This paper is organized in four parts: First is a review of the relevant academic literature.
Second is hypothesis development. Third is a discussion of data and methods used in the study and the results from the study. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the study's findings for theory, practice, and future research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the years, numerous authors have attempted to predict corporate failure using various methodologies. The most well known is Altman's (1968) multiple discriminant analysis of thirty-three bankrupt and thirty-three non-bankrupt manufacturers. The variables used in his seminal study are: (1) working capital/total assets, (2) retained earnings/total assets, (3) earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, (4) market value equity/book value of total liabilities, and (5) sales/total assets. This model is shown in Altman's (1968) study to be effective in predicting bankruptcy up to "two years prior to distress and that accuracy diminishes substantially as the lead time increases" (Altman, 2000).
Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan created the Zeta® Credit Risk Model (1977) as a second generation discriminant model which "appeared to be quite accurate for up to five years prior to failure…" (Altman, 2000) . The Zeta® model consists of seven variables: (1) return on assets, (2) stability of earnings, (3) debt service, (4) cumulative profitability, (5) liquidity, (6) capitalization, and (7) asset size. and 2009 compared to 7,075 non-failed banks noting that "such a measure offers important insights but may not be sufficient as a general, all-purpose tool." According to Jesswein, "the ratio is calculated by dividing the bank's non-performing assets (non-performing loans plus other real estate owned) by the sum of its tangible equity capital and loan loss reserves".
(6) Platt and Platt (1991) find that use of industry-relative ratios appear to add incremental information in bankruptcy prediction.
Recently, the authors of this paper have been analyzing the market-to-book ratios of a sizable sample of publicly-traded banks from 2006 to the present, using the following explanatory variables, among others (Jordan, et. al., 2009): (1) Ratio of non-interest income to interest income.
(2) Ratio of non-accrual assets plus owned real estate "ORE" to total assets. Because we find that these variables have significant explanatory power on the market-tobook ratio of our prior sample of publicly traded banks, we investigate in this paper the extent of their power in predicting the surge of bank failures since 2007.
Our ratios are somewhat different than ratios covered by the following studies:
Study Variables
Pantelone and Platt (1987) Leverage, liquidity, profitability, management efficiency, diversification and risk Pettway and Sinkey (1980) Operating expenses as a percentage of operating income and investments as a percentage of total assets Sinkey (1975) Cash and U. S. Sinkey (1978) Net capital ratio Ratios explored by Cole and Gunther (1998) come the closest to our variable set. As a percentage of gross assets, they explore the following variables: equity capital, past due loans, nonaccrual loans, other real estate owned, net income, investment securities, and large certificates of deposit.
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
It appears from the above research that bank failures can be reasonably predicted up to two years prior to failure using various methodologies. It also appears from the authors' previous research that banks' market-to-book ratios can be explained with high statistical significance by using the seven variables listed in the literature review.
Our hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1: The seven variables identified can be used to predict bank failure up to four years prior to the failure date.
Hypothesis 2: The ratio of the expense provision for bad debts as a percentage of total gross loans is a predictor of bank failure.
Hypothesis 2 is based on the reasoning that one of the seven variables explored in Hypothesis 1, the ratio of non-accrual assets plus ORE to total assets is a balance sheet measure of bad assets on the books. An income statement measure, provision for uncollectible accounts, represents the current period increase in bad debts on the books. It is logical that both measures, current and future bad debts, would concern bank regulators.
Due to loans. This leads to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The ratio of real estate loans as a percentage of total assets is a predictor of bank failure.
IV. DATA AND STUDY DESIGN Sample Data
We initially selected all the banks that failed from January 1 years of data prior to the failure quarter for our analysis of each failed bank and each randomly selected matching non-failed bank. We then used raw data for each of the failed and the non-failed banks for each selected quarter and calculated the following variables for each bank for each quarter:
(1) Ratio of non-interest income to interest income.
(2) Ratio of non-accrual assets plus ORE to total assets.
(3) Ratio of interest income to earning assets.
(4) Ratio of Tier One capital to total assets.
(5) Bank Holding Company dummy variable.
(6) Savings Bank dummy variable.
(7) MSA dummy variable.
(8) Ratio of bad debt expense provision to total gross loans.
(9) Ratio of real estate loans to total assets.
To test our hypotheses, we performed two types of statistical tests -ANOVA regression analysis and MDA.
For our total sample of failed and non-failed banks, we performed regression analysis to determine the relationship and strength of each variable to the failure status of each bank.
These tests were performed using failed bank and matching non-failed bank data from all quarters beginning one quarter prior to failure and extending back four years prior to failure. We also analyzed data from each of the quarters: (1) one year prior to failure, (2) two years prior to failure, (3) three years before failure, and (4) four years prior to failure.
We randomly split the failed and non-failed bank data into two groups: (1) a training group, and (2) a testing group. We conducted MDA on the training group data from all quarters beginning one quarter prior to failure and extending back four years prior to failure to produce a discriminant formula for predicting bank failure. This is the same time period used above in our summary regression analysis. Finally, we tested the discriminant formula using the testing group data.
V. RESULTS

Regression Results:
The results of the regressions of the failure status (1 = failed and 0 = not failed) against the nine dependent variables noted above for the four years prior to failure and the summary data is as follows:
ANOVA Regression Characteristics Failure Status and Various Financial Metrics
1 Top number is the coefficient and bottom number is the t-value. * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level. ** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level. *** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
Independent Variables
Summary Model .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
Regression Discussion:
As reported in the above table, each model is statistically significant at the .000 level. The dependent variable in our regression is the failure status of a bank. Either the bank failed (1 is entered as the dependent variable) or it did not fail (0 is entered as the dependent variable). Accordingly, we can interpret the coefficients as follows:
A. Coefficients:
Non-Accrual plus ORE to Total Assets RatioThis is a ratio of bank assets in a non-accrual status plus owned real estate repossessed to total assets and represents a balance sheet measure of bad assets on the books. The positive coefficient means that higher non-accrual assets and owned real estate as a percentage of total assets result in a higher probability of bank failure. This is not at all surprising. In the current crisis, the root cause of bank failure has been bad loans and mortgage backed securities. We expected a strong positive relationship between bank failure and bad loans and foreclosed real estate; which is what we see for the summary and the year -1 model.
Both years have large positive coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% level.
For years -2, -3, and -4, and we see non-significant relationships between bank failure and the non-accrual plus ORE to total assets ratio.
Ratio of Bad Debt Expense Provision to Total Gross Loans -
This is the ratio of bad debt expenses for the quarter to total gross loans. This is an income statement measure of the deterioration of loan quality for the quarter. The positive coefficient means that higher bad debt expenses as a percentage of total loans result in a higher probability of bank failure. This also seems obvious. However, we find that, although the coefficient is positive, it not statistically significant except for the year -1 model, where it is significant at the 10% level.
Ratio of Real Estate Loans to Total Assets -
This is the percentage of bank assets tied up in real estate loans. The positive coefficient means that higher real estate loans as a percentage of total assets result in a higher probability of bank failure. As noted above, the root cause of bank failure during our test period was generally the deteriorating quality of real estate loans. We would, therefore, expect a strong positive relationship between bank failure and real estate loans; which is reflected in all of the periods analyzed. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all of the models.
Interest Income to Earning Assets Ratio -
This is the ratio of total interest income to earning assets. The positive coefficient means that higher interest income as a percentage of earning assets results in a higher probability of bank failure. This is puzzling. One would expect that higher interest income would result in a lower probability of failure. It is possible that this is also a measure of risk and that banks making riskier loans would earn higher interest but not enough to make up for the higher risk of default. The higher interest income may also result from institutions increasing loans rates or implementing default interest rates for borrowers who are experiencing financial difficulties. This ratio is statistically significant at the .01 level for the summary model, but it is not significant for any of the yearly models.
Non-Interest Income to Interest Income Ratio -
This is the ratio of non-interest income to interest income. A positive coefficient would mean that higher non-interest income relative to interest income results in higher probability of bank failure. This ratio is generally not statistically significant in our model results.
Tier One Capital to Total Assets RatioThis is the ratio of Tier One capital available to support the assets of the bank. It is a cushion to cover possible future operating and investment losses that might be incurred by the bank. A negative coefficient means that more Tier One capital is associated with a lower probability of bank failure. This ratio is statistically significant at the .01 level for the summary and the year -1 models. It is generally not significant for the other models. Accordingly, we can use this information to devise a predictive model of bank failure similar to Altman's Z score and Zeta® score models by performing multiple discriminant analysis of the sample data.
As noted in the design section of this paper, we split the total sample of failed and nonfailed bank data into two groups: (1) a training group, and (2) a testing group to create and test a discriminant function. To create the function, we run multivariate discriminant analysis on the training group, using the same variables as in the regressions above, using data from all quarters beginning one quarter prior to failure and extending back four years prior to failure.
The resultant discriminant function is as follows: Based on the above noted MDA analysis, if the resulting BankZ Score TM is greater than 2.866, a bank is considered a failure risk.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis Results
The following are the results of our Multiple Discriminant Analysis on the training group of our sample of failed and non-failed banks:
Statistical Analysis:
The assumption of equal covariance matrices is tested using Box's M test. The value of the statistic is 15769.192 and the p-value is zero, using the F approximation. Therefore, the assumption of constant variance is not satisfied.
The adequacy of the model is tested as follows: (1) the canonical correlation is .498, (2) the Eigenvalue is .330, (3) Wilks' Lambda is .752, and (4) the Chi-square test value is 978.558.
These values indicate that the above noted discriminant function is significant at the .000 level.
We then use the above noted discriminant function to classify failed and non-failed banks for the training group and the testing group (the holdout sample). The results of the Multiple Discriminant Analysis for the quarter before failure and the four prior years for the training sample, the holdout sample, and the total sample are as follows: Aziz and Dar (2006) and the 76% success rate reported by Ozkan-Gunay and Ozkan (2007) . Our model also compares favorably to the Yim (2007) model that predicted 100% of the failed Australian financial firms one year in advance but only 33.3% failed firms two years in advance.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis Results
Summary Results
Yr -1 Results
Yr -2 Results
Yr -3 Results
Yr
VI. DISCUSSION
The hypotheses tested in this paper are as follows:
H1: The seven listed variables can predict bank failure up to four years prior to the failure date.
H2: The ratio of the expense provision for bad debts as a percentage of total gross loans is a strong predictor of bank failure.
H3: The ratio of real estate loans as a percentage of total assets is a strong predictor of bank failure. In addition, because the variables in our model are readily available to the public, investors and lenders can easily calculate the BankZ Score TM of each bank they are considering doing business with. This will allow them to modify the terms and monitoring activities involved in their relationship, better matching their risks with their rewards.
VII. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
As with any study, this study has limitations that might affect the generalization of the results. First, the results reported might be valid only for the period of time studied. Second, the economics associated with the recent rash of bank failures might not be repeated in the future or, if it is, the causality may differ from the time period examined by this study.
Accordingly, extreme care should be taken when attempting to generalize the results of this study to any other time periods.
Future studies may wish to examine the outliers in our failed bank data, any management differences between failed and non-failed banks, any geographic differences between failed and non-failed banks, and whether size has a significant effect on bank failure.
However, notwithstanding the limitations of this study, we believe the work makes a number of important contributions. First, it analyzes, in a timely manner, the 2007 to 2010 surge in bank failures. Second, the work provides a mechanism that uses readily available bank data to predict which banks to avoid as a lender, depositor, or an investor. Third, it offers insight and a basis for action to policy makers and bank decision-makers as a means to avoid such problems in the future. Further, it is hoped that this study will stimulate future research.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The goal of this study is to determine whether a formula, which includes certain open sourced variables readily available from bank quarterly call reports, has strong predictive power in identifying failed banks up to four years prior to failure.
The results of this study strongly support the proposition that a formula that includes the seven listed variables can predict with 88.2%, 78.6%, 71.4%, and 66.0% accuracy whether a bank will fail within one year, two years, three years, or 4 years.
The results also have important implications for potential bank investors and lenders who are considering putting money into a bank that has quantifiable risk of failure. In addition, due to the potential moral hazard issue, the FDIC has a strong incentive to identify early those banks that offer high interest rates for deposits which will be covered by deposit insurance should the bank fail.
If investors, lenders and regulators use our BankZ Score TM formula in a preemptive manner, they have the potential to identify banks with a high risk of failure and, in so doing, save much heartache and many dollars.
